This paper investigates the capital structure choices that firms make in their initial year of operation, using restricted-access data from the Kauffman Firm Survey. Contrary to many accounts of startup activity, the firms in our data rely heavily on external debt sources such as bank financing, and less extensively on friends and family-based funding sources. This fact is robust to numerous controls for credit quality, industry, and business owner characteristics. The heavy reliance on external debt underscores the importance of well functioning credit markets for the success of nascent business activity.
Introduction
Understanding how capital markets affect the growth and survival of newly created firms is perhaps the defining question of entrepreneurial finance. Yet, much of what we know about entrepreneurial finance comes from firms that are already established, have already received venture capital funding, or are on the verge of going public-the dearth of data on very early stage firms makes it difficult for researchers to look further back in * The authors are grateful to the Kauffman Foundation for generous financial support and to seminar participants at the Kauffman/Cleveland Federal Reserve Bank Entrepreneurial Finance Conference, the University of Michigan, the Stockholm School of Economics and the NBER Summer Institute Entrepreneurship Meetings for helpful comments on a previous draft. The usual disclaimer applies. 1 firms' life histories. 1 Even data sets that are oriented towards small businesses do not allow us to systematically measure the decisions that firms make at their founding. This paper uses a novel data set, the Kauffman Firm Survey (KFS), to study the behavior and decision-making of newly founded firms. As such, it provides a first-time glimpse into the capital structure decisions of nascent firms.
In this paper we use the confidential, restricted-access version of the KFS, which tracks nearly 5,000 firms from their birth in 2004 through their early years of operation.
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Because the survey identifies firms at their founding and follows the cohort over time, recording growth, death, and any later funding events, it provides a rich picture of firms' early capital structure decisions.
Our analysis is motivated by the widely held view that frictions in capital markets prevent startups from achieving their optimal size, or indeed, from starting up at all. In credit markets, startup firms face credit constraints, and the inability to access formal credit markets is widely thought to drive many firms to pursue financing from informal channels to finance their startup activity. This motivation is at the heart of an important literature in banking that considers the role of relationships in establishing information flows between banks and firms (see, for example, Rajan, 1994, 2000 .) The richness of the KFS data allows us to explore the extent to which startups rely on friends and family versus more formal financing arrangements, such as bank loans, credit cards, and venture capital.
Thus, rather than test specific theories of capital structure, our main goal is a more modest, descriptive one: to examine the financing choices that firms make when they launch, and ask whether any patterns emerge from the data. A null hypothesis is that idiosyncracies in market conditions and access to financial and human capital are reflected in a high degree of variability in the capital structure choices that nascent firms make. Under the null, no pattern would emerge. Rejecting that null in favor a particular capital structure for startup firms then opens the door to questions about which theories provide the best account for the observed capital structure choices that startup firms make.
Our main result is that newly founded firms rely heavily on formal debt financing.
Our calculations indicate that external debt financing-primarily through owner-backed bank loans and business credit cards-is the primary source of financing during a firm's first year. Indeed, our data suggest that the reliance on friends and family is an urban myth. The average amount of bank financing is seven times greater than the average amount of insider-financed debt; three times as many firms rely on outside debt as do inside debt. Even if we discard firms that do not use this source of financing, the average amount of external debt is nearly twice that of internal debt.
The reliance on formal credit channels over personal credit cards and informal lending holds true even for the smallest firms at the earliest stages of founding. The average prerevenue firm in our sample has twice as much capital from bank loans than from insider sources. And when we look at only those firms who access outside equity sources, such as venture capital or angel financing, we still see a preponderance of debt: the average firm that accesses external private equity markets still has around 25% of its capital structure in the form of outside debt.
Of course, these calculations only speak to the equilibrium amount of borrowing from inside and outside sources; they are driven by both the supply of credit as well as the demand for credit. Ultimately, it is challenging to separate supply and demand in the absence of a natural experiment. But to control for the fact that differences in firm quality or creditworthiness may be driving the patterns we see in the data, we make use of commercial credit scores of the firms. This gives us two avenues to control for demandside variation. The first is simply to include the credit score directly in our analysis as a proxy for firm quality. Or, by regressing the credit score on industry dummies as well as firm and owner characteristics that affect the demand for capital (such as the legal form of organization of the business and the owner's education), we can purge the credit score of demand-side variation, leaving us with a measure of supply-side variation in credit access. Using these strategies to partition the data into firms with easy access versus constrained access to capital, we can explore how much the capital structure decisions of nascent firms are driven by supply-side factors.
Surprisingly, this partitioning has little effect on the observed capital structure choices firms make. To be sure, firms with high unexplained credit scores have more financial capital. The level of financing of these firms is nearly three times larger on average than constrained-access firms. But the relative amount of outside debt to total capital is about the same for both types of firms.
Apart from the possibility that cross-sectional variation in creditworthiness drives our results, a second possibility is that credit conditions at the time of our survey were unique, and do not necessarily reflect broader patterns from other time periods. While ultimately we are limited to the data that are available, we speak to this possibility by considering the impact of capital structure decisions on outcome variables like firm survival, employment growth, and profitability growth. We find that having a capital structure that is more heavily tilted towards formal credit channels results in a greater likelihood of success. This fact holds even when we include the credit score as a measure of firm quality to guard against the possibility that unobserved factors drive both success and credit access. Our findings indicate that even if credit conditions in 2004 were unique, credit market access had an important impact on firm success.
This paper is related to a number of papers in the banking, capital structure, and entrepreneurship literature. Given the emphasis in the current work on the role of 4 formal banking channels, our paper is also related to the literature on the role of banks and other sources of financing for small firms (Peterson and Rajan, 1994 , 1997 , 2000 .
Finally, we also speak to a literature in entrepreneurship that focuses on the role outside financing alternatives to help firms grow.
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The remainder of the paper is as follows. We begin in Section 2 by describing the KFS in greater detail. Section 3 examines initial capital structure choices. We incorporate credit scores and other firm characteristics in Section 4. Section 5 explores multivariate regressions of capital structure on a range of business and owner characteristics to explain capital structure decisions. In Section 6 we examine how initial capital structure affects firm outcomes. Section 7 concludes.
The Kauffman Firm Survey
The KFS is a longitudinal survey of new businesses in the United States. This survey collected information on 4,928 firms that started in 2004 and surveys them annually.
These data contain detailed information on both the firm and up to ten business owners property, and financial capital (equity and debt) used at start-up and over time.
Information on up to ten owners includes age, gender, race, ethnicity, education, previous industry experience, and previous startup experience. For more information about the KFS survey design and methodology, please see Ballou et. al (2008) . A public-use dataset is available for download from the Kauffman Foundation's website and a more detailed confidential dataset is available to researchers through a secure, 3 For a noteworthy recent example of the role of outside capital in entrepreneurship decisions, see Cosh, Cumming and Hughes, 2008. Gompers and Lerner, 2001 , provide an excellent summary of venture capital. Wong, 2003 , is one of the first treatments of angel investing.
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remote access data enclave provided by the National Opinion Research Center (NORC).
For more details about how to access these data, please see www.kauffman.org/kfs.
A subset of the confidential dataset is used in this research-those firms that either have data for all three survey years or have been verified as going out of business in 2005, 2006 or 2007. This reduces the sample size to 3,972 businesses. The method we used for assigning owner demographics at the firm level was to define a primary owner. For firms with multiple owners (35 percent of the sample), the primary owner was designated by the largest equity share. In cases where two or more owners owned equal shares, hours worked and a series of other variables were used to create a rank ordering of owners in order to define a primary owner. (For more information on this methodology, see Ballou et. al, 2008) . For this research, multi-race/ethnic owners are classified into one race/ethnicity category based on the following hierarchy: black, Asian, other, Hispanic, and white. For example, an owner is defined as black, even if he/she is also Hispanic.
As a result of the ordering, the white category includes only non-Hispanic white. Tables 1 and 2 provide details on business characteristics. In Table 1 , we report key features of the business-its legal form, location, and other features of operations.
Roughly 36% of all businesses in the data are sole proprietorships, and about 58% are structured to provide some form of limited liability to owners. About 28% are organized as S or C corporations.
Half of the businesses in the survey operate out of the respondents home or garage; the vast majority (86%) market a service, and only a quarter of the firms in the survey have any form of intellectual property (patents, copyrights, and/or trademarks). Reflecting the fact that they are being measured at their inception, the firms are also tiny by almost any conceivable measure. Nearly 60% of the firms have no employees other than the founder, and less than 8% of firms in the sample have more than five employees in their first year of operations.
6 Table 2 considers the cash flow characteristics of these nascent businesses. Even though these firms are small, nearly twenty percent of firms (16.8%) have over $100,000 in revenue in their first year. Indeed, 45% of the firms in the sample have more than $10,000 in annual revenue in their first year. Of course, over 57% of firms have more than $10,000 in expenses, and almost one firm in four reports zero profit or loss. Table 3 examines owner characteristics in more detail. The entrepreneurs in our data are overwhelmingly male and white: less than one-third of respondents are female and over three-quarters are non-Hispanic white. In spite of the fact that most of the businesses in our data begin at home, in people's garages, with fewer than five employees, the overwhelming majority of business owners have at least some industry experience.
Less than ten percent of owners have no previous industry experience, while more than half have more than five years of industry experience. Likewise, more than forty percent of business owners have started a business before. More than 80% of respondents are over the age of 35 when they start their business, and roughly half the sample is aged 45 or older.
The entrepreneurs in our sample are relatively well educated. Less than 20% of respondents have less than a high school degree, while well over half of respondents have completed some form of a college degree. Finally, nearly a quarter of all respondents have received some form of advanced, post-graduate education. In broad terms, these demographics match those reported in other data sources. For example, these demographics are similar to those reported in Puri and Robinson (2008) , using the Survey of Consumer Finances, and Fairlie and Robb (2007) , using the Characteristics of Business Owners Survey. The standard prescription from pecking order models is that firms first should use internal cash, then rely on debt financing, and then rely on equity financing. Of course, most capital structure models implicitly assume an owner-managed firm but are most often tested using large, well established firms. How well do capital structure theories describe how beginning firms actually make their initial financing decisions? In this section we begin to answer this question by describing the capital structure decisions of startup firms.
To impose some structure on the details of startup fundraising, we group fundraising choices along two dimensions. First, we distinguish owner financing, informal financing and formal financing. We also distinguish debt from equity. Owner financing takes the form of loans or equity positions in the firm that derive specifically from the owner's personal wealth. Informal financing channels include debt or equity from family members and personal affiliates of the firm, while formal financing channels include debt accessed through formal credit markets as well as venture capital and angel financing.
A detailed look at capital structure
In Table 4 , we provide a detailed look at the capital structure choices that nascent firms make. It provides a breakdown of thirty different sources of capital for startup businesses. Over 75% of firms have at least some owner equity; of these, the mean amount is just over $40,500. If we include the quarter of firms with no reported owner's equity, the average owner equity amount drops to $31,734.
Owner debt plays a much smaller role. Only about 1/4 of firms have some form of owner personal debt, and the vast majority of this is mostly in the form of debt carried on an owner's personal credit card. The overall average amount of credit card debt used to finance startups is a modest $5,000, but this includes the roughly 75% of owners who do not use personal credit cards to start their businesses. Among those who do, the balance is considerably larger-$15,700, or about 1/3 of the size of owner equity.
But in general, personal credit card balances make up a relatively small fraction of the startup's overall capital structure at inception-only about 4 to 5% of the firm's total capitalization is in the form personal credit card balances held by firm owners.
While the owner-level capital structure is heavily tilted towards equity, the capital structure of insiders and outsiders is completely reversed. If we include the firms with zero values, firms use about five times as much debt as they do equity. This holds for both inside debt ($6,362) to equity ($2,102), as well as outside debt ($47,847) to equity ($15,935). But seven times as many firms report outside debt as report outside equity.
Yet, among those who do receive outside equity, there is no question that it is important.
The average amount of outside equity among the 205 firms who access this source of financing is over $350,000, roughly twice as large as the total financial capital for the average firm in the survey.
Turning first to insiders, we see that equity is uncommon. Only about five percent of the sample relies on equity from a spouse or other family members, and the overall average amount (including the 95% with no family equity) is only about two percent of the average funding. Yet, among the group who uses family equity, the source is important: the magnitude of insider equity is roughly the same as that of owner equity, and many times larger than the magnitude of owner debt.
Insider debt is more common, but still a small source of funding relative to outside debt and equity. The mean value of inside debt for all firms is $6,362, and this primarily comes from personal loans received by the respondent from family and other owners.
Loans directly to the business from owners or other family members are also important, but the fact that less than ten percent of surveyed firms rely on any one type of inside debt suggests that this funding source is not commonly relied upon by new firms.
When we turn to outsider debt, we see that on average it is the largest single financing category for startups during their first year of operation. While this no doubt reflects the relative supply of outside debt to other funding sources, it is noteworthy that only a relatively small fraction of this comes from credit card balances issued to the business.
Of the $47,847 average debt level, less than $2,500 on average comes from business credit cards.
One widely held view about entrepreneurial finance is that startups lack access to formal capital markets, and thus are forced to rely on an informal network of family, friends, and other financing sources like credit cards to bootstrap their initial financing. Table 4 speaks against this idea. First, outside capital is extremely important, even at the earliest stages of a firm's life. The average new firm has approximately $109,000 of financial capital. Of that, roughly half comes from outside sources.
To be clear, however, informal investors do play an important role for those firms who obtain external equity funding. Looking solely at the external equity funding, of the 205 firms who received some form of external equity funding, over half received funding from outside informal investors. The average amount, around $245,000, is roughly one-fourth the average for the handful of firms that report obtaining venture capital. 4 Second, the vast majority of this outside capital comes in the form of credit, either through personal loans made directly to the owner or through business credit cards.
Moreover, credit cards play a relatively small role for the average startup. If we total the average credit card holdings on all personal and business accounts associated with the business, the amount sums to less than half the average personal bank loan. If we tally the average personal bank loan and the average business bank loan, this amount is roughly four times the size of the average total credit card balances outstanding.
In some respects, these descriptive statistics suggest that pecking order does a good job of describing the capital structure decisions of new firms. If we treat owner debt and equity as internal funding, and abstract away from its capital structure, then we see that many firms rely on internal funding, fewer firms rely on debt, and fewer firms still rely on equity. This broadly conforms to the basic message of the Myers and Majluf pecking order. At the same time, this characterization misses important details, because it abstracts away from the interaction between capital choice (debt vs. equity) and from whom to raise capital-whether the capital comes from insiders or outsiders.
Capital Structure and Firm Type
Perhaps the most surprising finding in Table 4 is that formal credit channels-business and personal bank loans-are the most important sources of funding for startups. To push this observation further, we segment the data in Table 5 to report capital structure patterns for different types of startup firms.
The idea behind Table 5 is to isolate those firms that are in their very earliest stages of starting up, to see if the overall capital structure patterns hold there as well. This can be done according to a number of criteria. In the first column of Table 5 , we examine the 2,425 firms who have no employees other than the founder. These firms are small relative to the average reported for all firms in Table 4 -there total capital is only around $45,000 as compared to the roughly $110,000 in Table 4 . But proportionately, outside debt plays a quite similar role: the average non-employer firm has $19,500 in outside debt, or about 43% of its total capital, compared to approximately $48,000, or about 44% of total capital on average for firms overall. Of the outside debt, we again see that business bank loans and personal bank loans make up the bulk of the $19,500. Only about $2,500 comes from other sources on average.
The second column examines the 2,168 businesses which are home-based, meaning that they do not operate any office or warehouse space outside the home. These too are small, presumably including the proverbial "garage business" as well as businesses of a professional nature that operate out of a home office. The capital structure patterns for these businesses are remarkably similar to the non-employer businesses: about forty percent of their total capital is financed through outside debt, and the lion's share of that comes from personal and business bank loans, rather than credit card balances.
Another way to pinpoint firms at their earliest stages is to focus only on pre-revenue or pre-profit firms. We examine these firms in columns (3) and (4), respectively. These firms are considerably larger than the previous two categories, presumably because these include many firms that have secured inventories in advance of sales, or require external building space to operate. Indeed, these columns look quite similar to the averages reported in Table 4 for the whole sample.
Because the first four columns of Table 5 monotonically expand the size and scope of firms under consideration, they offer an alternative way to examine pecking order and access to capital, albeit descriptively. Moving from the first column of data to the fourth column of data more than doubles the firm's size by adding an additional $80,000 of total capital to the firm. By far the bulk of this comes from outside debt and equity, which together make up about half the increase in firm capital. Since columns (3) and (4) also contain some non-employer and home-based firms, this comparison understates the magnitude of the shift in capital structure. Thus, the comparisons across the columns of Table 5 indicate that friends and family is probably an earlier source of financing than outside debt, as previous accounts have indicated. It is just not terribly important in terms of total size.
The final two columns of Table 5 split the data according to whether the firm continued to operated throughout the first four waves of the KFS, or whether the firm ceased operations. Firms that survive look very much like the overall average reported in Table 4 . On the other hand, firms that ceased operations sometime before 2007 not only began smaller, but also had considerably smaller proportions of outside debt to total capital. Of course, it is impossible to draw any causal connection between these two observations, but in the next section we can examine causation more carefully by considering how credit quality affects these findings.
4 Firm Quality and Capital Structure Decisions 4.1 Credit worthiness, technology and pecking order Table 6 takes the richness of Tables 4 and 5 and boils it down to six categories: owner debt, owner equity, inside debt, inside equity, outside debt, and outside equity. These classifications are as described in the left-most column of Tables 4 and 5 . Reducing the amount of detail not only makes the pecking order that most firms use more apparent, it also facilitates more comparisons across different types of firms.
The rows of Table 6 are arranged from highest to lowest in terms of the overall weighted average level of 2004 funding. If we interpret the magnitudes as an indication of relative importance, then we see a clear pecking order emerge: first outside debt, then owner equity, then debt from insiders. Fourth in the pecking order is outside equity, followed by owner debt; the least used source is inside equity.
An alternative way to characterize the pecking order of nascent firms is to combine owner debt and equity into a single category, internal funding. Looking at capital structure this way, the average firm is roughly equal parts internal funding and outside debt. These two sources of funding are each roughly four times larger than the next largest source of financing. Regardless of how the financial pieces are assembled, outside debt plays a paramount role in funding newly founded firms.
13
One reason for this may simply be that outside debt is more plentiful than other sources of funding. To explore this possibility, we obtained commercial credit scores for each firm to identify high credit worthiness and low credit worthiness firms. Table 6 shows that while high credit worthiness firms have access to much more financial capital, they access capital in roughly the same proportions as low credit worthiness firms. Thus, a firm's credit score induces a first-order shift in the level of financing it obtains, but only a second-order shift in capital structure choice it makes.
Outside equity plays a substantially more important role in the capital structure of high tech firms. Across all high tech firms, outside equity is the third largest funding source behind outside debt and owner equity. Among high tech firms with high credit scores, outside equity is the largest form of financing. It is only the low credit score firms in the high tech sector that display a pecking order that resembles the average firm in the data-but even for those firms, owner equity is a more important source of financing than outside debt.
Separating credit supply from credit demand
To separate credit supply and credit demand, we exploit the availability of credit score information to identify cases in which firms faced unexpectedly easy or difficult access to capital. If the capital structure choices depicted in the previous tables are polluted by differences in the availability of capital, then this should control for that.
To account for this possibility, we regress the firms credit score on variables that proxy for demand-side factors that would influence credit ratings. We consider two models. First, we run the following regression:
14 where score ij is the credit score of firm i in industry j, β j are industry fixed effects.
Thus, the first estimation simply includes a set of 60 industry dummies.
For the second specification, we run the following regression:
where score ij is the credit score of firm i in industry j, β j are industry fixed effects, and F is a vector of owner characteristics, and K is a vector of firm characteristics, both of which likely vary with demand for credit. For this specification, we include a full set of industry dummies, a set of education dummies corresponding to the breakdown presented in Table 3 , and we also include factors such as race, ethnicity, industry experience, intellectual property, legal structure of the enterprise, whether the business is home-based, and whether the business sells a product or provides a service. While these coefficient estimates are interesting in their own right, a full discussion is beyond the scope of this paper. Indeed, in Robb, Fairlie and Robinson (2009) we explore the issue of race and access to credit in greater detail.
The idea behind both specifications is that by purging the credit score of variation that is linked to factors driving the demand for credit, the remaining variation in credit score would reflect supply-side credit restrictions. Firms with high unexplained credit scores should have easier access to capital, while firms with low unexplained credit scores
should have relatively more difficult access to capital. Moreover, the differences in their access to capital should reflect suppliers willingness to lend, rather than differences in capital needs.
Recovering the regression errors from these two models gives us a mechanism for classifying firms as credit constrained or unconstrained. Of course, a firm with a low unconditional credit score is constrained, but this low score may arise endogenously because the firm has little need for external capital, low growth prospects, and therefore 15 does not take the steps needed to boost its credit score. By relying on the conditional credit score as opposed to the raw credit score, we circumvent these problems. Tables 6 and 7 report pecking orders for firms in the lowest and highest quintiles of the unexplained credit score distribution. Firms in the lowest quintile face the most severe unexplained restrictions to credit access, since their credit scores are much lower than would be predicted based on their demand characteristics. In contrast, the top quintile have the easiest access to credit, since they have high unexplained credit scores,
given their access to capital. Table 6 presents the detailed classification of funding sources, while Table 7 presents the aggregated data.
In general, the results of Tables 6 and 7 mimic the results from the previous table, in that they show a first order affect on the amount of capital raised, but only a second order effect on capital structure choice. Credit constrained firms have capital structures that look very similar to those of unconstrained firms. The primary difference is that unconstrained firms have much higher levels of capital investment.
Explaining Funding Decisions
Having described initial capital structure choices in detail, we now turn to the task of explaining the observed variation in capital structure choice. We do this in Table 11 , where we regress capital structure ratios on owner and firm characteristics. In general, Table 11 reports OLS regressions of the following form:
where β j are industry fixed effects, F is a vector of owner characteristics, and K is a vector of firm characteristics. The dependent variable in each column is a financial ratio-either outside debt, outside equity, outside loans, or inside finance-each scaled by the firm's total capital. (The unmeasured category is the ratio of owner financing to total capital.) Outside loans are a subset of outside debt that include only personal bank loans and business loans. The firm characteristics include not only the survey characteristics described in Tables 1-3 , but also the firm's credit score, a measure of quality that might well be unobserveable to the econometrician in other circumstances, but would be readily observable to credit market participants.
Do gender and race play a role in determining initial capital structure choices? Table   9 suggests that this is definitely the case. First, gender: women receive significantly less outside capital than other groups. The results for women indicate that the average female-owned business holds about 5% less outside debt than the same male-owned business. Although these results may reflect the fact that women face more restricted access to capital in the credit market, the data do not allow us to rule out the possibility that, notwithstanding the industry fixed effects, female-owned businesses simply may demand less outside capital, perhaps because they are more likely to be second-income businesses.
Next, the question of race. Table 9 shows that black-owned businesses hold much less outside debt in their initial capital structure than other businesses. The magnitudes are similar to those found for gender: the ratio of outside debt to total capital is about 13% lower for black-owned businesses than for otherwise equal white-owned businesses.
Whether this attributable to supply-side or demand-side considerations, it is important to note that these regressions hold constant the industry of the business, the firm's credit quality, the owner's education, and their prior industry and startup experience.
Thus, unobserved heterogeneity in underlying business quality seems unlikely to be a first-order explanation for the difference.
We also observe other racial differences in capital structure choice. Hispanics and
Asians, but not Blacks, rely heavily on inside finance. 5 While Hispanic or Asian ethnicity explains little variation in access to external capital, these groups average about 25% more inside capital in their total capital structure. Given that the average firm in Table   4 has an inside-to-total capital ratio of around 12%, this effect is enormous in economic magnitude, representing a 75% increase in the average amount.
Across the board, increasing hours worked in the business is associated with greater outside and inside capital, and consequently, lower owner financing. Similarly, owner age has an increasing but concave relationship with access to external capital, for both debt and equity, while it has the opposite relationship for inside financing.
Prior experience plays an interesting role in determining initial capital structure.
Owners with prior startup experience tend to rely on external equity more than others.
In contrast, Table 9 indicates that owners with more industry experience rely significantly more on their own financing, since the association between industry experience and capital type is negative across all types reported in the table.
The regressions also include, but do not report, owner education. Different categories of education have similar experiences accessing external debt equity, but there is a pronounced effect associated with inside financing. Namely, those who do not finish high school are significantly more likely to rely on inside financing than other groups.
Since the regressions include industry fixed effects, it is not the case that this is driven by sorting of low education respondents into industries with low capital requirements.
Rather, this is probably an indication that lower quality businesses are more likely to rely on inside financing instead of accessing external capital markets.
The business characteristics reported in the bottom of the table demonstrate that firms with lower asymmetric information problems enjoy more ready access to external capital sources, and in particular, external credit funding. Home-based businesses rely more heavily on owner financing, while firms with multiple owners have larger fractions of outside-to-total capital. Comparing the point estimates in Table 11 to the averages in Table 4 suggests that multiple-owner firms receive about a ten percent increase in the baseline amount of outside debt, and about a 25% increase in the baseline level of external equity (from around 8% to around 10%). Firms that have intellectual property
are not more likely to access outside debt, but are more likely to access external equity, than those that do not.
Does Financial Access Affect Survival?
It is widely noted that startup firms are a key driver of growth in our economy. How we are testing is that firms with greater levels of external capital had better growth prospects. Table 12 tests this hypothesis. It includes the same basic set of owner and firm characteristics, plus the ratio of outside debt to total capital and the level of 2004 sales.
The outside debt ratio has a positive and highly significant effect on revenue growth and employee growth, but a statistically insignificant positive effect on profit growth.
To attach a causal interpretation to these findings, it is important to control for unobserved characteristics that might affect access to debt and success. In that regard, including the credit score and other firm characteristics are essential for our findings.
Including the credit score allows us to conclude that controlling for firm creditworthiness, firms that accessed more external debt were nearly ten percent more likely to be in the top revenue group, and nearly six percent more likely to have hired employees. Note too that this also controls for the initial revenues the firm experienced in 2004, therefore the effect is not attributable to initial size. Table 12 indicates that, indeed, initial capital structure decisions are important for firm success.
The owner and firm characteristics, which are included as controls in Table 12 , are interesting in their own right and raise many questions for future research. First, they
show that female-owned businesses are significantly less likely to grow than male-owned businesses. Black-owned businesses are significantly less likely to have grown in terms of profits or sales, but they are more likely to have added employees than white-owned businesses. Asian-owned businesses are also more likely to have added employees, although Asian ownership is unrelated to revenue or profit growth. And finally, the vector of firm characteristics that might describe a firm, a priori, as a lifestyle business or not indeed predicts whether a firm has grown.
Conclusions
This paper uses a novel data set to explore the capital structure decisions that firms make in their initial year of operation. In the vast majority of cases, this is when the firms in question are still being incubated in their founders' homes or garages, before outside employees have joined the firm in any significant number, and certainly well before the firms in question would be attractive to the types of funding sources that are the focus of most discussions of early stage financing.
In spite of the fact that these firms are at their very beginning of life, they rely to a surprising degree on outside capital. The notion that startups rely on the beneficence of a loose coalition of family and friends seems misleading given our findings. While the data suggest that informal investors are important for the handful of firms that rely on outside equity at their startup, the data also indicate that most firms turn elsewhere for their initial capital. Indeed, roughly 80-90% of most firms' startup capital is made up in equal parts of owner equity and bank debt. The fact that the debt is financed through arms length relationships, and not through family and friends networks, is worthy of further research.
To be sure, our findings underscore the importance of liquid credit markets for the formation and success of young firms. If startups hold the key to growth in western economies, then surely economic growth hinges critically on the smooth functioning of credit markets that enable young firms to be formed, to grow, and to succeed. Indeed, if we extrapolate a bit, our findings suggest that the financial crisis that started in the housing market will be especially problematic for financing startups. While an economic crisis may increase the supply of potential entrepreneurs in the short-run, through job losses in other areas, the collateral restrictions implied by the dramatic collapse in housing prices should impair to a major source of capital for startups. Financial constraints facing startups, long thought to be acute, even in boom times, will almost surely be more acute going forward. The following tables change the classification scheme from formal vs. informal to personal vs. business to illustrate the importance of personal access to formal bank channels. 
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